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DATA TRENDLINE
WHITE VOTER PREFERENCES:
PREDICTABLE TRENDS
There is a certain pattern and consistency about trends in 
white voter support for the various parties over the past decade which 
poses interesting questions. Some equally interesting answers suggest 
themselves.
The firm Market and Opinion Surveys (Pty) Ltd has conducted 
strictly comparable polls among white voters since 1969 for Rapport 
and for the Centre for Applied Social Sciences. These polls of voter 
preference, once adjusted to apply to likely voters in contested 
constituencies, have always given results close to the outcome of 
elections.
In this Data Trendline the patterns of support are examined 
from November 1969 to July 1983 in order to explain some of the 
underlying dynamics of white politics in South Africa.
The National Party: The English-speaking Role
Figure I shows trends in Afrikaans-speaking, English-speaking 
and overall support for the National Party, as associated with certain 
major events in South African politics. A few aspects are quite clear.
The support for the party from English^speakers has tended to 
fluctuate more than the dominant Afrikaans-speaking support up to the 
1982 split and the formation of the Conservative Party. English voter 
support for the NP would seem to drop away sharply when Nationalist 
politicians question loyalty or goodwill towards Afrikaans interests 
of English voters, as in 1972. However, the fluctuations are not 
erratic and more generally follow the same pattern of Afrikaans­
speaking support. The English-speaking voters are not, as is often 
thought by some members of the NP, fickle "floating" voters.
lr
English-speaking voters have twice "strengthened" the NP 
support base during times of flagging Afrikaans support - after the dip 
in support associated with the "information scandal" in 1979, and during 
the serious crisis of disunity in 1982; the problems associated with 
Dr. Andries Treurnicht.
The Party as Security Blanket
Looking at the broad trends shows that the NP fortunes are 
more affected by political issues than by economic cycles. The NP 
gathers its strongest support in times of political insecurity: note,
for example, the recovery in popularity during the 1973-1975 period of high 
black strike activity. This factor was certainly not the only one ' 
operating, but cannot be discounted.
Of note also is the high point of support for the party during 
the massive "Soweto" and other township disturbances. Even the massive 
security clampdown on 18 black organisations in late 1977 did little to 
draw away English support, which reached its highest point ever in that 
year. Separate questions on the issue at the time of the polls#suggested 
that somewhat less than 10 percent of English-speaking voters drew away 
(or further away) from the NP during these events.
There may also be an indication in the results that Zimbabwean
Independence boosted the fortunes of the NP among insecure white voters,
1)
and this is borne out by other research as well.
The National Party in Difficulty
The "Information Scandal" and the events leading to the 
resignation of John Vorster, both from the Premiership and the State 
Presidency, certainly lowered the overall level of support. As 
said above, however, the English-speaking supporters rallied soon 
and stabilised the overall trend, with Zimbabwe probably figuring 
prominently in their motivations.
1) At that time 71% of the people polled saw South Africa’s future 
as one of war, unrest and disruption.
The early stages of the planning for the new constitutional 
proposals did not cause any sagging of the NP's fortunes, but disunity 
in the party certainly did. The party's profile dropped badly during 
1982. If it had not been for increased support among English-speakers, 
presumably in sympathy with Prime Minister Botha in his struggle with 
the right-wing, the overall support for the NP would have dropped below 
40 percent of the electorate.
The drastic effects of the split in the party ranks appear 
to have been remarkably short-lived, however, and the party at this 
stage seems headed back towards its average level of support over the 
decade. ^
Patterns in the Opposition
The pattern in opposition support (Figure II), shows clearly 
the replacement of the United Party - New Republic Party formation as the 
major opposition by the Progressive-Reform and the Progressive-Federal 
formations. The PRP/PFP fortunes changed with the entry into the party 
of "non-traditional" liberals in 1975, with new constitutional proposals in 
1977 which took account of ethnic interests, and.with the election of 
Dr. F. van Zyl Slabbert as leader in 1980.
Its position as major opposition party now seems fairly secure, 
with the failure of the right-wing parties (which.are not united, but 
simply combined in the graph) to sustain their 1980 - 1982 pattern of 
growth.
The Herstigte Nasionale Party, the National Conservative Party, 
and more recently the Conservative Party, as the right-wing or ultra­
conservative formations, do not actually reflect a growth in ultra-conservatism 
(See Indicator, Sample Issue and Vol 1 No 1). It is a brand of 
voter inclination which has always been there, but has been "uncovered" 
by the growth in more pragmatic consciousness, both in the NP itself 
and in the opposition on the other side.
1) These trends are supported by two additional polls before July 1983 
not reflected in the diagram for reasons of space.
See for example how the apparent growth of ultra-conservatism follows the 
growth of PFP support. As the electorate as a whole and the NP has 
moved to the "left", so the right-wing has become more visible.
The position of the CP,currently with some 12-13 percent 
of voter support on its own, is stronger than that support would 
suggest because of constituency delimitations in rural areas and a 
concentration of support in the Transvaal.
However, as previous analyses in Indicator have suggested, 
it has limited additional growth potential if one considers the pattern 
of voter attitudes, and it already appears to be in slow decline 
towards a figure of some 10 to 15 percent of the overall electorate.
The Implications
Patterns in South African electoral support are not particularly 
fluid. Generally the trends are slow and steady. The factors which 
cause shifts are generally complex, and the comments above have simply 
identified some salient factors among others.
The patterns would at least suggest a hypothesis, however.
It would seem that unrest and disruptive pressures, within limits tend 
to cause a consolidation of white voter support around the party which 
is strongest in terms of numbers and image, the NP. Such consolidation is 
not ideological, but a reaction to political insecurity.
Opposition strength is fostered by internal, problems in the 
dominant party, but not, it would appear, by external political 
pressures in the environment. If such pressures cause serious 
material costs for white voters the pattern may change. At this 
stage, however, the basic patterns established in the past decade- 
and-a-half seem to be holding.
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